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Introduction*
This working paper discusses the relevance of the 
frontier concept to the establishment of gold mi-
ning camps in West Africa since the mid-1990s.1 
Exploring the example of the artisanal and small-
scale (gold) mining (ASM),2 I will examine econo-
mic, social and cultural aspects of mobile mining 
communities, their internal social relationships and 
conflicts with local communities and the state. Lo-
cal miners3 establish mobile camps on a very par-
ticular internal African frontier (Werthmann 2009, 
Grätz 2010, Panella 2010, Werthmann and Grätz 
2013). I will compare three mining sites and discuss 
their situation against the background of classical 
and recent anthropological studies on migration, 
social innovation and local resource management. 
Gold miners in West Africa are mobile young 
people trying to cope with various economic con-
straints. Although marked by massive labour mi-
gration, a heterogeneous social and ethnic com-
position and multiple interests and conflicts, their 
communities are nevertheless characterised by 
common features of social, economic and legal 
* Eine Zusammenfassung in deutscher Sprache findet sich 
am Ende des Textes.
1 The empirical data derive from several field trips to Be-
nin, Burkina Faso and Mali between January 1999 and April 
2004. Fieldwork was made possible thanks to the assistance 
and financial support of the DAAD, Bonn and especially the 
Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle an der 
Saale. For valuable comments on an earlier version of this 
paper, I am very grateful to Katrin Bromber and Katharina 
Lange (ZMO, Berlin).
2 ASM is the most common designation for all modes of 
non-industrial (artisanal and small-scale) gold mining, cf. 
UNIDO (2006).
3 Generally, when not specified, I use all nouns as gender 
neutral. In fact, the majority of miners are men.
dimensions that span West Africa. In the course 
of this paper, I will examine the characteristics 
of this emergent new ASM4 gold mining frontier 
(Grätz 2003b, 2004), based on the assumption 
that they constitute relatively (semi-) autonomous 
so cial fields (Moore 1978) with regard to their 
norms, modes of labour organisation and lifestyle 
patterns (Grätz 2006, 2009b). I will ethnographi-
cally compare three mining camps situated in Be-
nin, Burkina Faso and Mali. Basically, I will build 
my analysis on a discussion of the African fron-
tier theorem elaborated by Igor Kopytoff (1987, 
1999). Comparing the case of the artisanal gold 
mining frontier with other (especially agrarian) 
settler frontiers in contemporary Africa (Rösler 
2004, Doevenspeck 2005, Le Meur 2006), I will 
elaborate differences as well as commonalities in 
these frontier processes. Additionally, I argue in 
favour of a modification of Kopytoff’s model (ibid.) 
with regard to the relationship between economic 
and cultural innovation pertinent to contemporary 
African mining frontiers. In contrast to Kopytoff, 
who claims that frontiersmen generate economic 
and technical innovations but maintain cultural 
norms and mores, I will demonstrate that fron-
tier communities in my cases are characterised 
by both economic and cultural transformations. In 
other words, gold mining communities at this new 
frontier are marked simultaneously by various 
quite novel social, technical and cultural features, 
as well as by many older patterns of communica-
tion, perception and social affiliation brought by 
4 Regarding the related debates as less important for the 
arguments of this paper, I use the term small-scale synony-
mously with non-industrial, artisanal or informal gold min-
ing and the term mining without distinction for quarrying, 
digging out or excavating. 
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This theory refers to a frontier of settlement due 
to mining or the search for land for ranching and 
agriculture, a frontier constantly chang ing and ad-
vancing into non-colonised territories (although 
partly inhabited by first-settling ethnic groups) 
without infrastructures. Turner argued that the 
existence of an area of »free« land, its continuous 
recession and the advance of American settlement 
westward was crucial to American history. From 
this perspective, frontier communities are made 
up of pioneer migrants as people estab lishing 
emergent (often socially heterogeneous)8 social 
communities. There were various waves of settle-
ment in North America; the most important among 
them driven by gold miners in various regions that 
formed a major focus of Turner’s studies. This ear-
ly study using the frontier theorem has received 
much criticism, primarily because of its apologetic 
and idealistic character.9 
Many of the social processes he referred to are, 
however, also relevant in other parts of the world. 
Pioneer migrants in general seem to share many 
features, although the social organisation of their 
communities may differ. Thus, the concept was 
subsequently transferred to other areas such as 
Africa, Latin America and New Guinea and to de-
pict other economic frontiers, like agricultural or 
pastoral frontiers, etc. Similarly, the volume The 
African Frontier, edited by Kopytoff (1987), was of 
considerable importance (especially for Africanist 
anthropologists) and underlined the significance 
in African history of migratory movements into 
new areas, not only on the margins but also within 
existing political entities and colonised territories 
(a departure from Turner’s own historical cases). 
Kopytoff’s model of an internal frontier is much 
more refined and became the starting point for the 
more sophisticated discussions of the concept in 
contemporary African studies in general and re-
cently with regard to artisanal mining (Grätz and 
Werthmann 2012, see below) in particular.
above all in the historical and political sciences. There is a 
bulk of literature on the frontiers of the Ottoman and Habs-
burg Empires, the cape frontier (Jacobs 2003) etc. Interlo-
cking, constantly negotiated zones between different reli-
gious and ethnic groups are often labelled ethnic frontiers 
(e.g. Lentz 1999, Lentz and Kuba 2006, Pelkmans 2003). Fi-
nally, we have to consider the often purely metaphoric use 
of the term.
8 California, for example, was (already before the gold 
boom) a multicultural society (Anglo-Americans, American 
Indians, Mexicans and Chinese and Spanish immigrants), a 
fact that paced immigration. 
9 Turner ignored the perspective of those affected by these 
movements, who did not conceive these spaces as void or un-
civilised at all. Furthermore, his belief that the patterns of 
behaviour of these pioneer migrants, whom he portrayed as 
risk-taking, enduring individuals, were the starting point of 
the soul of »the« American man, an idea also known as the 
Turner thesis, is questionable.
the emigrants from their home regions. These pa-
rallel processes are influenced and negotiated in 
relation to the adjacent communities and to pres-
sures from the state. In the light of many divergent 
processes, it is problematic to distinguish a priori 
ethnic innovation from cultural conservatism, as 
Kopytoff argues. 
Taking the historical dimensions of mining fron-
tiers in West Africa into account, I furthermore pro-
pose to distinguish primary and secondary fron-
tiers, i.e., those regions with a longer tradition of 
mining and migration should be seen in a different 
light than those that only recently became boom 
areas. Both types have remarkable differences, 
especially with regard to power relations between 
local and immigrant miners.5
Finally, I argue that the frontier theorem should 
be seen as a heuristic category that is neverthe-
less related to very heterogeneous contexts and 
conflict settings. In this respect, I agree with Ko-
pytoff that a frontier entails particular political 
processes, especially the relationships between 
migrants, local societies and the state (ibid.). 
More over, internal social processes also play an 
important role in merging people of very hetero-
geneous social and ethnic origins into a migrant 
settler community. Consequently, I will explore 
the various ways of integrating miners into nas-
cent mining communities, despite the many con-
flicts prevailing in that field. 
The paper concludes with a discussion on the 
unique professional identity of migrant miners in 
the making. Their experiences are shaped by their 
constant liminal situation in the camp, specific 
norms of conflict solution and risk sharing, modes 
of communication and a discernible lifestyle.
Gold mining camps and frontier communities
Gold mining areas in West Africa, especially those 
that have only recently experienced gold booms, 
establish dynamic and plural frontier zones. These 
spaces are defined through migration and a parti-
cular appropriation of new territories and resour-
ces, and they point to regimes of social change. 
The concept of the frontier6 was initially introdu-
ced by Frederick Jackson Turner (1893) to describe 
the historical processes of the colonisation of North 
America by migrants, starting in the 17th century.7 
5 »Locals« and »immigrants« are only very rough, general 
categories. There are many more nuances in identities and 
more social categories involved, see below.
6 Rieber distinguishes between consolidated frontiers, 
frontiers of progressive settlement and symbolic frontiers, 
with partially overlapping features (2001: 5813). Other au-
thors define a frontier as a space of economic development 
and expansion, e.g. Hudson, who perceives a frontier as the 
»the fluid outer boundary of a growth region« (Hudson, in 
Dumett 1998: 2).
7 Without always referring to the initial argument, the term 
was also extensively used in the geographic-political sense, 
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posits. The most famous regions were the Savan-
nah regions Bambouk, Manding, Bouré and Lip-
tako (today Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso), but 
also forest areas (in today’s Ghana and Ivory Coast). 
Eventually, the trade in gold, along with that in salt, 
cloth and cola nuts, stimulated cross-region al con-
nections and the proliferation of typical middle-
man groups such as the Hausa and Djoula. Ap-
parently, gold was forcibly extracted by warrior 
kings, often by alleged dependents, who may have 
been slaves. Early accounts repeatedly mention 
the famous, rather mythical »Kankan Mussa«, em-
peror of the Mali kingdom, who was said to have 
extracted tons of gold. Subsequently, several re-
gions and peoples began engaging in small-scale 
mining, especially along the rivers banks and as a 
side business in the dry season. The scale of these 
activities often changed over time due to the ha-
zards of demand on the regional and international 
markets. Arhin (1979), Chauveau (1978), Kiethega 
(1983), Schneider (1990), Pillet-Schwartz (1993), 
Garrard (1980) and especially Dumett (1999) have 
described extensively the ways in which early gold 
mining was developed with techniques still partly 
relevant today. In contrast to recent times, strong 
hierarchies prevailed in businesses and were exer-
cised essentially by local producers and not so 
much by migrants. The Asante kings in particular, 
who used gold as signs of power and items of trade, 
became famous in the accounts of contemporary 
merchants (Garrard, op. cit.). These early mining 
frontiers were often related to the appropriation of 
formerly unpopulated areas, which often had to be 
cleared of forests. 
With the advent of direct colonial administra-
tion and large-scale economic intervention, parti-
cularly the Gold Coast regions, widely known for 
their treasures in gold, attracted investors and 
developing semi-industrial exploitation schemes in 
the southern parts of the colony.12 These mining 
corporations, often using coercion, also existed in 
Guinea, Mali, Upper Volta and northern Dahomey 
(Benin, Grätz 2009b). Thus, parallel industrial and 
artisanal frontiers emerged with inevitable con-
flicts between the colonial state and miners trying 
to work without licenses. Almost everywhere, the 
post-colonial state preferred industrial mining to 
the detriment of small-scale operators, who were 
often persecuted by state agents. There were, 
nevertheless, many smaller gold booms from the 
1940s to the 1970s in less-controlled areas, espe-
cially in southern Mali and northern Guinea, as 
well as the Ivory Coast and Liberia. 
At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of 
1990s, new booms occurred simultaneously in se-
12 Almost simultaneously, the first boom period in South 
Africa emerged, enacted by immigrant new settlers. The re-
lationship between gold booms in South Africa and in Gold 
Coast has still not been extensively studied.
The internal frontier relates to less-densely po-
pulated areas shaped by new waves of migration, 
the appropriation of territories and resources (Bil-
lington 1967)10 and the establishment of new sett-
lements. The immigrant settlers perceive the new 
territories as unexploited and lacking in political 
control.11 Internal frontiers are liminal zones of 
particular social interfaces between actors of diffe-
rent interests, resources and cultural backgrounds 
and between different spheres of exchange. These 
interstitial spaces are often subject to conflict, 
but also to novel arrangements. Particularly the 
gold mining frontier in West Africa, especially the 
afore mentioned boom regions, is such an internal 
frontier from Kopytoff’s perspective, although he 
developed his model was primarily during pre-co-
lonial times. 
Although it forms a belt across the savannah 
zones of West Africa, this frontier consists of scat-
tered mining sites and camps rather than closed 
geographic lines. The ASM gold mining frontier is 
a particular set of phenomena comprising the es-
tablishment of various gold mining and processing 
sites and the appropriation of mineral resources 
by simple technical means. Furthermore, the gold 
mining frontier features new massive migratory 
drifts toward rural areas; the advance of miners’ 
camps or mining villages, including new markets, 
infrastructures and businesses of all kinds, finally, 
consumption opportunities and, consequently, ra-
pid socio-economic shifts occurring also in regions 
that hitherto were only partially integrated into 
the realm of market economy. The West African 
gold mining frontier is related to a general boom 
in small-scale gold mining since the 1980s. It en-
tails (unstable) income opportunities from mining 
and is characterised by migration especially in the 
dry season and by a flourishing gold trade (Grätz 
2004b). The gold mining frontier is most often re-
lated to the emergence of new boom areas as »hot 
spots« of economic and social change.
Historical and recent gold booms in  
West Africa
Gold mining has been practised in West Africa 
since the 7th century. Several regions had local 
systems of gold exploitation, mainly of alluvial de-
10 »A frontier process may be described as that process by 
which individuals and their institutions were altered through 
contact with an environment which provided unique oppor-
tunity to the individual by making available to him previous-
ly untapped natural resources.« (Billington 1967: 7) 
11 Kopytoff writes: »[A frontier] is an area which, on the 
one hand, is beyond the control of regional metropolises 
and, on the other, is weakly enough controlled by its present 
occupants that outsiders from the metropolises can move 
into it with the realistic hope of achieving an autonomous 
political existence. The frontier presents to outsiders an ›in-
stitutional vacuum‹ that makes it open to the possibility of 
constructing in it a new society« (Kopytoff 1999: 33).
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In the following section, I will present three 
case studies of mining camps in Benin, Burkina 
Faso and Mali, followed by a discussion of their 
commonalities and differences.
Comparing three mining sites
Kwatena, Atakora Mountains (northern Benin)
As already mentioned, gold has been mined in 
this region since the colonial period, which was 
followed by occasional exploring missions.17 Local 
small-scale mining did not start until 1992, when 
migrants from Togo and Ghana first started to ex-
ploit alluvial and later reef deposits in the region 
south of Natitingou. Their initial success set off a 
gold boom and instigated further massive labour 
migration from all over the region and abroad. 
Miners initially profited from a period of political 
transition in Benin and mined the deposits with 
simple techniques such as pans, sluices, chisels and 
sledgehammers. In the following years, govern-
ment authorities expelled them several times by 
force and confiscated equipment, money and gold. 
Over the intervening years, alluvial mining has 
become partly permitted after a series of negoti-
ations and new expulsions, especially of reef mi-
ners. The mining region is situated in the Atakora 
Mountains in the north-western part of Benin. The 
gold miners work along the rivers and mountain 
slopes, exploiting alluvial and eluvial deposits, as 
well as engaging in small-scale mountain mining. 
Kobadan / Numusulku, Southwest Mali
The region of southwest Mali along the Niger Ri-
ver is part of the historical region of Manding. It is 
inhabited mainly by ethnic Soninké, Malinké, Ful-
be herders and Somono fishermen. The peasants 
combine wetland cultivation (mainly rice) with 
animal husbandry. In the respective villages, 
caste-confined craftsmen play an important role. 
The Manding region in Mali and the Bouré area in 
northern Guinea Republic have been known since 
the 13th century principally for artisan gold mi-
ning carried out by slaves for Mandé chiefs and 
kings and by local inhabitants. The region has re-
cently experienced a considerable move to artisa-
nal gold production again. Migrants from all over 
West Africa, especially Malians and those from 
neighbouring Guinea, opened old and new mining 
sites and established huge camps. Many young lo-
cal people who had migrated elsewhere returned 
home again. 
17 Although the mine close to the village of Kwatena was 
known to the locals because of its partial exploitation in co-
lonial times (Grätz 2009a), there was no local tradition of 
gold mining to that date, mainly due to rigid state control of 
these zones, which the state considered its sole property up 
to the end of the 1980s.
veral regions in West Africa.13 Illegal forms of ex-
ploitation and gold trading (smuggling) developed 
alongside small enterprises controlled by the state 
or licence holders. This recent growth of small-
scale (artisan) gold mining is related to massive 
waves of labour migration into rural areas, above 
all in Mali, Niger, Benin, Ghana, Burkina Faso, 
Ivory Coast14 and Guinea.15 A new feature is the 
mas sive engagement in reef mining by numerous 
migrant small-scale miners. This development has 
resulted in more profits and more-demanding sys-
tems of labour organisation involving more actors. 
Additionally, the burgeoning mining camps have 
resulted in new forms of sociability (cf. Werth-
mann 2010, see below). The exploitation of new mi-
ning sites and the reopening of abandoned depo-
sits led in most cases to the rapid establishment of 
new immigrant communities with new markets, in-
creased circulation of money and the spontaneous 
development of infrastructures and services, pri-
marily by young men but also by women. Recently 
discovered mines also led to the massive migra-
tion of petty businessmen, traders, barkeepers and 
those offer ing other services, including prostitu-
tion. Consequently, the gold mining camps in this 
new mining frontier consist of people of ex tremely 
heterogeneous social and ethnic origin. In a short 
period of time, small villages became larger settle-
ments; new settler communities have emerged in 
all the countries mentioned.16 In most cases, the 
official state law (for example in the Code Minier) 
diverges considerably from local practices, which 
is especially significant regarding access to re-
sources, labour organisation and the legitimacy 
of mediators. As a consequence, conflicts often 
emerge between gold miners and state authori-
ties, but also between locals and migrants and / or 
within miner interest groups over the rights to 
exploita tion and settlement (Grätz 2011). 
13 The migration to the old mines can be seen as a reaction 
to crisis situations, especially in the agricultural sector, in 
which fewer job opportunities, the effects of structural ad-
justment and the general devaluation of F CFA in 1994 have 
resulted in higher living costs (»push factors«, for Burkina 
Faso see Asche 1994: 194f; for Benin, Kohnert 1994, Cellule 
macroéconomique 1997). Other factors, relevant to some 
areas, are droughts and civil wars (cf. also Vwakyanakazi 
1992, Hilson 2006).
14 For recent case studies on gold mining in Burkina Faso, 
see e.g. Traoré (1989), Carbonnel (1991), Yaro (1996), Gueye 
(2001), Jaques et al. (2004), Luning (2006, 2008, 2010) and 
Werthmann (2000, 2001, 2003a, 2003b, 2009, 2010),
15 It is estimated that in West Africa about 500,000 people 
work full- or part-time in small-scale gold mining.
16 I hesitate to employ the term »gold rush« because it 
implies too much irrational social action and chaos. I would 
like to focus on the many more-regulated social relations in 
the field. I do not deny the dramatic dimensions of the rapid 
changes in consumer practices, alcohol abuse, the moneti-
sation of everyday life, the production of winners and losers 
and the use of violence in many gold mining areas.
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distant from any local Gourma settlement. The 
nearest village is some 15 km away. The Gourma 
are peasants cultivating millet, corn and cotton. 
Many Fulbe herders also roam the area. Migrants 
came from all over Burkina Faso, especially from 
the Mossi regions west and north of Ouagadougou, 
in large numbers from Niger, but also from Nige-
ria, Benin and Ghana. The camp comprises a site 
d’extraction, a separated processing area (com-
mon also to other sites) and a small governmental 
outpost of the CBMP (Comptoir Burkinabé des Mé-
taux précieux). 
The mining camp Kobadan, the main focus of my 
case study, consists primarily of straw huts. It is 
situated four kilometres from the important allu-
vial gold site of Numusulku and some 20 km from 
the hinterland of the Niger River.18 There are many 
such camps,19 shaped by the presence of people of 
heterogeneous social and ethnic origins and the 
establishment of new markets and circulations of 
money. The locals, in fact, have always engaged in 
gold mining as a seasonal side business; the young 
people mined the gold under the auspices of a lo-
cal foreman, the chief of gold (damantigi) and his 
assistants (tombolomaw) in each zone (see below). 
Currently, the Malian state only partially in-
tervenes in this »informal« business (Keita 2001, 
2002).20 The mining camp of Kobadan, like that of 
Niaouleni, was established close to the (predomi-
nantly alluvial) exploitation sites, but as a camp 
apart from the local villages. In contrast to Koba-
dan, the former camp of Niaouleni became a per-
manent village.21 This process also led to the esta-
blishment of a marketplace that is situated on the 
path right between the exploitation grounds and 
the miners’ camp. 
Bountwanou, Burkina Faso
The mining site of Bountwanou in the Gourma re-
gion, named after a village about 30 km away, is 
a quintessential mining camp. The encampment 
was established only in August of 2001, but subse-
quently grew rapidly and peaked at the beginning 
of 2002.22 Boutwanou was initially a satellite camp 
for miners based in Boungou, which grew with the 
latter location’s decline in production and the dis-
covery of new veins. This camp was located quite 
18 I carried out fieldwork in this region in 2000 and 2003. 
The major sites of exploitation shifted several times to new 
deposits and reopened placers. After several fires in the 
camp, some of the migrants now live in the growing miners’ 
village of Nioualeni.
19 Besides the neighbouring Nioualeni, I also worked in 
the mining camp of Kokoyon, a camp of similar size south 
of Banankoro. 
20 The government mining board is trying to establish 
a system of official licences and is promoting foreign in-
vestment, with limited success. As regards the small-scale 
mining sector, the UNIDO has helped set up a program to 
promote better techniques and to reduce environmental 
degradation and health problems.
21 In this camp, local inhabitants obliged people to build 
only clay houses or to rent from owners of such houses. Of-
ficially, this was said to prevent damage by fire.
22 In March 2003, I visited the camp for the last time. The 
camp had lost at least three-quarters of its inhabitants, and 
gold mining was dramatically reduced. Only two traders re-
mained, and only one employee of the CBMP supervised the 
remaining activities, partly conducted by local dwellers. At 
this time, the majority of all miners I encountered in 2001 
had gone some months before to a more prosperous mine 
close to Gomboussoukou. A similar move of almost an entire 
camp to a new site happened some time before in 2001 with 
the move from Boungou (where today also some remaining 
miners and locals continue alluvial mining) to Bountwanou.
technical aspects simple technologies (pans, 
sluices), manual work, use 
of motor pumps, sometimes 
use of pounding machines;
seasonality
organisation of labour organised mining teams, 
»sponsor system«
patronal mode of organisation
interethnic mining teams
gold trade and  
market integration
gold traders organised in  
patron-client networks 
from petty traders to 
wholesale traders
offering cash on the spot, 
advancing money / working 
as moneylenders
to a large degree »illegal« 
migration balance of seasonal and 
permanent migration,  
professionals and 
part-time miners
spatial strategies, 
modes of settlement
settlement often in  
remote places mostly close 
to extraction sites; 
markets and lodging 
often combined;
predominantly independent 
mining camps; partly 
renting from landlords; 
seldom own buildings
legal aspects,  
modes of internal 
conflict resolution
particular set of rules 
on access to resources, 
property regimes
modes of sharing, 
reciprocal relations 
among miners
relations of  
immigrant settlers to 
the local communities
often conflicts over arable 
land, wells or religious sites;
tensions
Table 1    General common features characterising 
small-scale mining communities in West Africa
Comparing the different case studies is evident-
ly not an easy task, since it normally requires that 
all data and findings be discussed within a similar 
framework. The process of fieldwork was in all ca-
ses a very exploratory one, always involving not 
only place-specific, contextual knowledge, but also 
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owner may work with trusted organisers and / or 
work himself in various phases of the extracting 
works. In any case, he is a petty entrepreneur, 
investing in equipment and the maintenance of 
his / her workforce, and is generally rewarded with 
half of the yield. Smaller, especially alluvial de-
posits (placer gold) may be worked by mini-teams 
sharing the yields more or less equally. They are 
petty entrepreneurs, investing in several shafts 
and »sponsoring« the teams. In all cases, the en-
trepreneur bears a small risk of getting only part 
of his investment back, because yields are uncer-
tain. The gold trader also acts as a »sponsor«: a 
moneylender trying to bind clients and diversify 
income opportunities. This system of risk sharing 
(Grätz 2003a, 2009b) occurs in all three cases, es-
pecially in reef mining. However, the productivity 
of gold deposits and the exploitation period varies 
among the sites. This scenario is a kind of trade-
off. On the one hand, the more uncertain the 
yields, the higher the possible gain for the shaft 
owner in case of success. On the other hand, the 
shaft owner has to supply the basic needs of his 
assistants, regardless of yields. The size of each 
team differs. Sometimes teams are very small, es-
pecially in alluvial mining, and sometimes very 
large, especially in reef mining, which involves 
sub-teams working in shifts. Additional hierar-
chies may be a result. In all cases, the degree of 
formalisation of both the teams and the organisa-
tion of work is low. In many cases, the aforemen-
tioned internal property regimes stand in con-
trast to local norms and to state laws, creating a 
particular plural legal situation without necessa-
rily leading to conflicts. Access to gold deposits 
and rules of exploitation are linked to modes of 
simple appropriation by anteriority (on a first-
come basis), either by force, negotiation and / or 
compensation. Furthermore, the aforementioned 
patron-client mode of labour organisation marks 
the small entrepreneurial activities and places 
the mining chiefs at the forefront of decision-ma-
king and arbitration processes. The typical pro-
perty regulations at the various sites generally 
comprise the »right of first discovery« to exploit a 
shaft, provided that the person is able to meet the 
basic investment needs (equipment, workers, ri-
tuals). This right of use is primarily tied to actual 
exploitation and participation by workers, paying 
tolls and respecting sharing rules. Furthermore, 
such a »holder of rights of use« may rent or lease 
a shaft in exchange for various shares. Finally, 
there is often the possibility to work in turn, e.g. 
dividing up shafts (prosperous veins). 
Often, the owner of a mine has to pay contribu-
tions to local landlords, to ritual authorities or to 
the common funds of the miners. Generally, the 
rights to the exploitation of shafts and pits are 
allotted to the person who discovered them and 
a sharper perspective honed through comparison 
and investigation in several locations. Additionally, 
I am dealing with emergent structures and norms 
that are undergoing permanent shifts. In the fol-
lowing sections, I will, however, try to discern some 
important commonalities as well as differences 
among the three mining sites. In general, I com-
pare technical aspects, the organisation of labour, 
forms of migration and the appropriation of space, 
as well as legal aspects. On the basis of this frame-
work of analysis, I will inspect basic communalities 
and differences pertinent to all case studies exami-
ned here. The general common features relate to 
the criteria summarised in table 1.
There are other similarities shared by all different 
gold mining sites that emerged in a boom period. In 
a diachronic perspective, for example, one may first 
find a period of a sometimes violent appropriation 
of resources and harsh tensions within the migrant 
community and between migrants and locals. Fol-
lowing the tensions, the internal and external rela-
tions of the mining communities stabi lise and there 
are phases of negotiations with adjacent societies 
before finding more reliable mutual arrangements. 
After the end of a boom period and the depar-
ture of the majority of miners, the local popula-
tion, along with the remaining miners, start ta-
king over many pits to continue small-scale mining 
as a side business at a lower intensity. New acti-
vities continually emerge at the abandoned sites, 
as infrastructure continues to be used and local 
dwellers profit from the experience gained. Even 
after the decline of a local gold boom, consider able 
economic changes persist. Some people use the ac-
quired capital for small shops, others specialise in 
itinerant trading and head for the bigger towns.
Commonal it ies and di f ferences 
All of these common elements could be further ex-
plained in detail and show pertinent variation in ac-
cordance with basic local conditions and contexts. 
In the following, I will discuss some of them. First of 
all, I examine the modes of labour organisation and 
legal aspects, including those of internal conflict 
resolution. Analysing the organisation of labour, we 
see in all cases an intricate system of labour divi-
sion, including hierarchies, shift work and modes of 
sharing. The main actors in the mining fields are: 
patrons or chefs d’équipe, assistants or secrétaires; 
team miners, assistants and guards, but also women 
and children who pound and mill (in reef mining) 
and mobile gold traders (see below). These catego-
ries could of course be refined to differentiate social 
and ethnic origin, age, gender etc. Generally, miners 
work in small teams headed by a team chief, who is 
in most cases also the owner of a shaft.23 The shaft 
23 For a hard day’s work, miners may earn between 2 and 
50 Euros. 
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started exploitation first, assuming he or she24 
has access to all necessary technical and finan-
cial means to do so. In case this person does not 
possess these means, either completely or partly, 
he / she may conclude some sort of contract with a 
small-scale entrepreneur or patron who engages in 
exploitation for shares in the yield or the payment 
of a lump sum or recurring compensation. Sharing 
in this context means the sharing of the yields in 
accordance with the division of roles; the investor 
as the head of the team receives the biggest share 
(50 % in most cases).25. Additional shares for all 
members are divided in accordance with contri-
butions in work and skills. There is always a mi-
nimum guaranteed share, irrespective of illness 
and other factors, provided that the venture was 
successful. However, the share may also vary in 
accordance with the individual’s work ethic.
The shaft owner operates as a small-scale in-
vestor, but should at the same time act (with all 
rights and duties) as team leader (chef d’équipe). If 
the owner is not able (or not willing) to participate 
personally in running the extraction work on site, 
he / she may hire a miner as a trusted organiser 
(secrétaire). Thus a chief’s actual participation in 
the exploration and extraction work may vary from 
active continual engagement of his own labour 
force to the hiring of agents and specialists for 
each task. The patron usually pro cures working 
equipment, rents motor pumps, feeds the wor-
kers and pays medical costs when needed (which 
he may deduct later when the profits are divided 
up). The shaft owner (patron, chef de parcelle, chef 
de trou) acquires the use rights for the period of 
effective exploitation of the shaft or plot. He / she 
may lose these rights if he / she abandons the shaft 
for a longer period of time or lets it to others (with 
or without compensation, rent, shares etc.) for a 
longer period of time. This also applies when the 
shaft is abandoned even if, after significant time 
has elapsed, the mine proves to be very profit-yiel-
ding when exploited by successors. Such an occur-
rence is a widespread cause of dispute, which is 
generally settled in favour of the most recent user, 
who nevertheless may be asked to pay off a certain 
amount of compensation to the first »explorer«. 
Taking the actual exploitation into account, we 
cannot employ concepts of property (in the clas-
24 The vast majority of shaft owners are actually men. I en-
countered only one case of a female shaft owner (in Benin). 
25 Most miners regard these arrangements as fair and 
risk-sharing for two main reasons: first, the shaft owner 
may lose almost all his investment if the shaft is not produc-
tive at all, but at least the workers were maintained during 
the work. If the team is successful, he consequently earns 
a higher proportion and may deduct his expenses; and sec-
ond, he knows or should know best how to organize works, 
including the rental of pumps etc., but also how to defend 
the mine against competitors; these are preconditions for 
its success.
sic, narrower sense),26 but rather to temporal use 
rights, because these entitlements have to be re-
newed by continual actual engagement on the mi-
ning site. On the other hand, there may be cases of 
»selling the claim« when an owner no longer has 
the means to exploit it, wants to leave the mining 
area permanently or »rents out a shaft« during 
a limited absence. The terms of contract may in-
clude either finite payments or shares in raw pro-
ducts (gold containing ore).27 A second pattern of 
use rights applies to relatively large, productive 
shafts that are difficult to exploit by only one team 
or that were discovered by several teams. In this 
case, the teams work in turn. One or more teams 
may often work for a week or up to ten days before 
others may enter the shaft. The previous team will 
engage in processing work and subsequently rest, 
waiting for their new period of exploitation. This 
process keeps the team small, allowing easier ma-
nagement by the individual team leader.
All territorial rights of exploitation (in terms of 
limits between shafts or zones of exploitation)28 
are debated and divided among the shaft owners. 
This process can hardly be regarded as permanent 
personal property assignment because this alloca-
tion is, as mentioned above, closely linked to actual 
usage of the shafts. As a consequence, delimitation 
disputes are also settled within the group of shaft 
owners. These quarrels between individual shaft 
owners occur more often, whereas conflicts be-
tween groups of shaft owners from different villa-
ges are infrequent. Such disputes may occur when 
larger, productive shafts are discovered. In these 
instances, and when the shaft allows a division into 
sectors, the gold veins are commonly exploited by 
several teams in turns. Miners regard these arran-
gements as equitable in accordance with their own 
values. These concepts of justice are often opposed 
to the local land rights of the adjacent communi-
ties, above all those of farmers. The latter, regar-
ding the disputed areas as their own, frequently 
demand compensation. The consequences are, 
never theless, quite diverse. Frequently, contin-
ually stressful confrontations result in violent 
clashes between miners and locals. In most cases, 
working arrangements are made, like the payment 
of some compensation and fee for rituals (Benin, 
Mali). However, the central tenet is that all mining 
areas officially belong to the state; therefore local 
land rights cannot be officially claimed and are 
26 Hann, however, employs a much broader definition of 
property (2000: 1). Cf. also von Benda-Beckmann, Franz and 
Keebet (1999).
27 In arrangements similar to tenancy, there are rarely 
fixed sums, but rather irregularly paid shares (in most cases 
in raw products), the amount of which is very much deter-
mined by the actual success of the team.
28 The delimitations of zones and claims are marked out 
(with the help of charcoal, wooden barriers etc.) in the pres-
ence of witnesses.
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in many cases a miner will get the same share if 
he has been absent for some time because of an ill-
ness or family affair, while his portion may be re-
duced if he has been lazy or unreliable. Moral ob-
ligations include a fair and equal division of hard 
work and the acceptance of sanctions, but they 
also imply accepting different tasks in accordance 
with a miner’s level of experience, expertise and 
physical capacity (Grätz 2009b). 
Elements of a moral economy (Scott 1976) of 
gold mining are important aspects of the rules 
and modes of organisation in many mining teams. 
Apart from these informal rules, concrete institu-
tions help guarantee benefits for all and organise 
redistribution. The fact that mining entrepreneurs, 
team leaders and successful traders are supposed 
to contribute more than others to fundraisers in 
times of need is important, because these dona-
tions not only limit their accumulation, but also 
represent a sort of instrumental taxa tion.30 These 
schemes most often occur in contexts in which mi-
grants live close to the locals or even settle in their 
villages, for example in the Atakora region of Be-
nin, where adjacent villages have become mining 
camps. 
Another aspect of the particular moral stan-
dards among young gold miners is the realm of 
spare time, including ostensive forms of consump-
tion and recreation (cf. also Werthmann 2008). 
These attitudes are favoured by the large selec-
tion of consumer goods, fashionable clothes, food 
and alcohol etc., but also video cinemas and dance 
parlours in most mining camps. There is, for in-
stance, the mutual obligation to invite each other 
to drinks or food, which is far from being a waste 
of money, but can be seen as a reinvestment into 
the community.
I have described the general social and cultural 
situation in most mining camps, which in its ac-
tual shape very much depends on a camp’s demo-
graphic size and distance from bigger towns and 
markets. In the following section, I will return to 
the basic technical aspects and working arrange-
conduct the excavations in a way that avoids injuries and ac-
cidents. His experience will give him respect and prestige, 
and the miners are more inclined to follow his advice. Team 
leaders have to live up to their role, including »being fair«, 
if their workers are to stay with them and not join another 
team leader for the next extraction cycle. Hierarchies thus 
contribute to creating a security of working arrangements. 
They are flexible enough that former gold diggers may be-
come team leaders or small entrepreneurs after acquiring 
experience, esteem and, of course, sufficient capital.
30 There are also fundraisers (cotisations) organised by 
representatives of the local population. They dare not a tax 
solely for the exclusive benefit of the locals. This contribu-
tion in cash and in kind may be redistributed during fes-
tivities, but also in forms of communal infrastructure like 
schools and medical centres, churches etc. that are in prin-
ciple open to all.
subject to individual negotiations. In the case of 
Kobadan (Mali), the amount of this compensation 
and other duties is high, because a local vigilante 
group (tombolomaw) established a forceful manage-
ment (see below). In other cases, as in Bountwanou, 
migrant mining chiefs were successful in simply re-
fusing to pay more than a few fees.
Generally, hierarchies in gold mining are flat. 
They are related to differences in position in the 
organisation of labour; the heads of teams and 
»sponsors« become small-scale entrepreneurs, 
leaving room for continual renegotiation of pow-
er relations. Sometimes, big men with outstand ing 
guiding and organising aptitudes dominate, acting 
both as small-scale entrepreneurs and as media-
tors (Werthmann 2003a). Generally, a need for 
organisational skills explains why many mi grant 
miners accept power holders, despite their lack of 
formal legitimacy. Some power holders augment 
their power when state agents more or less recog-
nize them, often in hopes of playing them off against 
others. Typical conflicts are those be tween mining 
chiefs disputing the limits of their mines, the pos-
sibility to enlarge them or share them and possible 
»thefts« in yields. A wide range of quarrels usually 
occur between workers and chiefs over sharing, 
betrayal and the proper use of equipment. A third 
domain is relations to local inhabitants and state 
agents. 
Conflicts are often adjudicated by a sort of as-
sembly of all mining chiefs, which exists in various 
forms with various degrees of formalisation, stabi-
lity and effectiveness in all the presented cases. As 
a rule, gold miners try to avoid appealing to any 
court outside their group. Only in very few cases 
were problems presented to the local village head 
and even more rarely to governmental authorities. 
The basic differences between the cases include 
the degree of involvement of state agents or local 
authorities in these matters. In Kwatena, Benin, the 
police were rarely called and the village author ities 
dealt only with conflicts that did not involve mining. 
Only recently was the state able to intervene in these 
matters. Despite the afore mentioned divergent in-
terests, I found many instances of reciprocity and 
equity among miners across the various case stu-
dies. I already mentioned systems of risk sharing 
between small pit owners and miners, as well as 
between miners and gold traders.29 For example, 
29 I see the social hierarchies as an accepted part of the 
»rules of the game« in the mining field. They are based on 
patron-client relationships and cannot be explained simply 
in terms of exploitation or oppression, but rather through an 
ethics of risk sharing. For example, miners can accept that 
a bigger share of the profits is reserved for the patrons in 
exchange for the supply of materials and expertise and for 
managing capacities, while accepting the risks entailed in 
mining. A good team leader, miners say, is someone »who 
knows« not only where and how to exploit gold veins and to 
organise the shifts, but also how to work properly and how to 
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weights such as 1 F CFA coins and matchsticks 
are used. Most of the local petty traders operate 
as trading agents for master traders. Together, 
they form informal and international trading net-
works31 that lead all the way up to international 
gold traders (Grätz 2004b). Most gold traders act 
as moneylenders, consequently obliging the mi-
ners to sell their gold to them. These gold traders 
are an important element in the system. They link 
the guild-like production of gold to the wider mar-
ket economy by offering immediate benefits. Gold 
traders usually try to bind miners as clients by gi-
ving them loans that oblige them to sell them gold. 
The constant need for cash obliges miners to sell 
their gold immediately, which promotes a prolife-
ration of the trade of moneylending. Very often a 
network of trad ers is based on patron-client ties 
and the sharing of risks between local and town-
based wholesale traders.32 The legal status of gold 
traders differs, depending on official state politics. 
In Mali, the gold trade is not officially allowed, but 
is not persecuted, in contrast to to Benin and Bur-
kina. In Kwatena (Benin), the state has no local 
trading boards but works with agents. Illegal gold 
trade has declined, but still persists due to the hig-
her price that illegal gold traders offer. In Bountwa-
nou, as in other such camps in Burkina Faso, there is 
a system of licensed gold traders operating the daily 
business in a particular section of the camp. They 
in turn are obliged to sell to the local branch of the 
governmental gold board CBMP, buying gold once 
a week in their small office, employing strict po-
licies as regards prices, weighing etc. In Burkina 
Faso, as well as in Benin, official and non-licensed 
traders continue illegal trading actions.
Small-scale gold mining in West Africa is con-
ducted mainly in two ways: as a side business car-
ried out by the local populations close to mining 
pits (particularly in alluvial gold extraction) or as 
activity primary occupation in some mining sites. 
The latter is linked to the influx of many migrant 
miners, either leading to the enlargement of pre-
vious settlements or to the establishment of new 
mining camps. The cases discussed here belong 
to the second category. Such mining sites arise in 
one area and then another. In all these cases, how-
ever, the number of miners decreases considerab-
31 The way gold trading networks are organised is similar 
to trading systems in rural markets, where trading agents 
act as intermediary buyers on behalf of master traders, e.g. 
as Saul describes for Burkina Faso (1997) and Adanguidi 
(2001) for Benin. The main difference here is, however, not 
its (official) illegality, but its heterogeneity in terms of the 
ethnic and social background of traders on different levels 
of the system. Gold trade does not fit into the »ethnic argu-
ment«: it is neither embedded in kinship relations, nor does 
it constitute a distinct corporate group with an exclusive 
group identity, at least not yet.
32 For an account of the various risks in gold mining, see 
Grätz (2003a, 2009).
ments within the (AS) gold mining frontier in West 
Africa and underline the importance of the gold 
trade within that system.
Technical aspects
Similar mining techniques are employed in all 
aforementioned cases, especially in alluvial gold 
mining, in which miners chiefly work with pans 
and sluices, hoes and shovels. A typical reef gold 
extraction cycle consists of the extraction of gold-
bearing rocks in the galleries or pits; the pounding 
and milling of the gold ore (mostly done by women); 
and washing and panning to separate out the gold 
dust. The most important steps in the extraction 
of alluvial gold are the digging of pits, the extrac-
tion from gold strata and finally washing / panning 
using sluices and pans in several refining steps. 
Miners will use either motor pumps or simple pans 
at the same site depending on the financial assets 
of the teams or entrepreneurs. Differences are pri-
marily in the way the pits are established. Since 
alluvial mining follows the river sediments in Be-
nin, larger trenches are created. Special wood en 
tablets are used that are produced in a village in 
Togo. In reef mining (dominating large parts of 
the Atakora site, northern Benin and the Bount-
wanou area, Burkina Faso), a miner works with 
pickaxes, chisels and sledgehammers. He usually 
extracts gold in mountain shafts together with one 
or two mates. In contrast, mining in the mountains 
is much harder and more hazardous (especially 
deep beneath the surface), but these rocks usually 
contain more gold. A full ethnographic account of 
technologies and procedures of extraction would 
exceed the scope of this paper. Differences include 
the use of crushing machines, which, however, are 
used only in Bountwanou and some other sites in 
Mali and Ghana. The use of mercury is very wide-
spread in Burkina, but not in Mali and Benin. 
Generally, mining teams conduct their daily busi-
ness on the basis of unwritten, oral rules, contracts 
and agreements. Exceptions sometimes apply to spe-
cific tasks like shifts, but credits, too, are written 
down. Some better educated people tend to proceed 
this way and are often hired by mining chiefs as se-
cretaries. The associations of miners only partly for-
malise the rules and proceed ings. The most impor-
tant task for the secretary is to accomplish a record 
of formally recognised cooperatives (which hardly 
ever represent the totality of the active corporate 
groups) and to write letters to the state administra-
tion. In Mali, the degree of literacy is generally very 
low; similarly, I only rarely came across any written 
documents in Kobadan. Nevertheless, to avoid quar-
rels, one member of the tombolomaw wrote down all 
accepted pit owners in a booklet. 
Gold trade 
Usually, gold is sold in small amounts on the spot 
to petty traders. Local scales and simple gold 
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friends and acquaintances of his, to work with 
us. They became the first mining chiefs. (Mi-
chel, August 2001, Tchantangou)
This account is typical of narratives of the start 
of the mining boom in the Atakora Mountains in 
northern Benin. This narrative of origin may blur 
the actual facts in many ways, but it shows that at 
its core the mining boom was related to the immi-
gration of non-locals to the region. The migrants 
(mainly young men) not only initiated the business 
(by simply ignoring local prescriptions from the 
state and parts of the local population) through the 
introduction of simple technologies, know-how and 
organisational skills. Together with other experi-
enced miners, the pioneer migrants also intro duced 
some basic rules, norms and perspectives that have 
subsequently been appropriated by some local and 
most immigrant miners. They adopted and con-
stantly shaped this emergent internal modus ope-
randi of gold mining in accordance with changing 
technical and logistic requirements, the develop-
ment of the gold market and later interventions by 
the state and local village authorities. Mi ners in all 
these camps developed a particular mode of con-
sumption, enabled by the great varieties of services 
and goods on offer. This includes a well-established 
culture of extensive drinking, smoking and eating 
practices; hair and other dress codes; but also par-
tying and visits to bars and cinemas. Some of the 
young miners spent their money as fast as they 
could earn it in ostentatious ways.35
The work and lifestyle, sociability and self-percep-
tion of Beninese migrant miners correlate with the 
main elements of what Bulmer (1975) called occu-
pational community in the making, sharing leisure 
and workplace (id.86), a socio-cultural form rela-
ted to a distinct group, their social positions and 
dispositions.36 
Generally, there are two patterns of settlement. 
First, migrant miners have frequently estab lished 
mining camps composed of makeshift tents, straw 
huts and shelters (the most widespread examples 
are Bountwanou and Kobadan). Second, migrant 
miners (and locals) have otherwise either ren-
ted houses or built their own (Kwatena) in vil-
lages close to the mining sites. The Kobadan site 
combined both of these elements; in addition to 
a huge mining camp adjacent to the mining pits, 
the small village of Kobadan (some 5 km from the 
mining site) included an enlargement of several 
houses built in concurrence with the new mining 
35 Many local inhabitants offer goods and participate 
from the mining boom.
36 Utilizing the historical example of North America, 
Richard Knapp characterises such mining communities as 
»... domestic space of people who often were or are hetero-
geneous in character, of diverse origins, and drawn together 
by the need to work« (Knapp 1998: 4).
ly during the agricultural high season and increases 
considerably in the dry season. Numbers may also 
change in periods of festivities and religious du-
ties. Factors like rainfall and rivers drying up can 
also trigger the seasonality of activities.33 
Apart from these changes in numbers, the inner 
composition of the mining communities differs in 
accordance with the time spent in the mines and 
the degree of professionalism. Miners rarely re-
turn to their home regions, but engage more con-
tinuously and exclusively over a longer period of 
time in gold mining, moving to new mining fields 
or exploring them when necessary. Migration 
is linked to the diffusion of the special arrange-
ments, norms and roles guiding small-scale mi-
ning in several such mining camps. Migratory pat-
terns also set up new economic circles related to 
the circulation of goods, to new traffic connections 
and to the proliferation of skills, financial assets 
and knowledge.34
Migration, modes of settlement and relations 
of migrant miners to the local communities
The rapid establishment of new mining camps can 
be observed in many parts of West Africa. These 
nascent communities do not begin with a dearth of 
knowledge; rather, skills and practices are impor-
ted with the movements of pioneer migrants. 
The retrospective accounts of a young local gold 
miner in Kwatena, northern Benin, serve as example:
We went to meet a Togolese in Tchantangou 
in 1992. First, we only helped him carry some 
goods and mount a motorbike. The second time 
we encountered him on the way back from Kara 
(Togo), where he said he had just completed a 
successful business transaction. He told us that 
he was getting gold from the mountain rivers. 
One day we visited him and helped him with his 
work at the Perma River. Consequently, he gave 
us some gold dust. Some days later, we sold the 
gold and made some 50,000 FCF. Soon others 
arrived. Our mate told us that there was more 
gold in the mountains. He organised a mining 
team, bought some equipment and conducted 
the extraction work. He explained to us the ru-
les and modes of conduct, including the rituals 
to observe. Some other Togolese arrived later, 
33  In Kwatena in Bénin, miners have a weekly, small-scale 
pattern of migration as a way of commuting to Kwatena, 
possibly due to short distance and frequent transport avail-
ability. 
34 In the case of ethnic Anyanga miners (Togo), we are 
dealing with typical pioneer migrants, specialised in alluvi-
al mining, who at the same time are part-time yam growers. 
They reinvest large parts of their income from gold mining 
(carried out over some three or four months of the year) into 
hiring labour working on their plantations back home. They 
are thus able to multiply their earnings in a rather short 
period of time.
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perception, they establish camps distant from 
settlements, fields or pathways in a sparsely po-
pulated rural area. Pioneers in particular consi-
der themselves »developers« of void regions. They 
claim a valorisation of new grounds, point to the 
advent of infrastructures resulting from their ac-
tions and markets and display a general arrogant 
view. Although exceptions exist, this phenomenon 
is especially present in »remote areas«. »Nobody 
was there before our arrival« is a common state-
ment by migrants, as is: »We were the ones who 
brought new markets, incomes and life to the re-
gion.« Urban traders in particular show little re-
gard for local cultural specificities, although they 
try to keep on good terms with the locals.
Conversely, local dwellers, especially the more 
farming-oriented, often perceive the massive in-
flux of foreigners as a threat to the continuity of 
local culture and the balances in local economic 
life. Especially elder people and religious author-
ities attach religious significance to the same 
territories, which often play an important role in 
their self-awareness and identity. This, however, 
often contrasts with the patterns of local youth 
and women, who see economic opportunities in 
the new mining camps. The fact that young local 
inhabitants share many elements of the discourse 
of autochthony and religious authority more often 
has to do with their wish to establish control over 
immigration and very often over the resources and 
their share in it. Their position has less to do with 
a possible feeling of loss that may be associated with 
the perspectives of their elders in these debates. 
Even when they are about to damage fields, gar-
dens or pastures, they consider digging for gold 
more valuable. The divergent perspec tives on the 
effects of local gold mining booms are certainly a 
matter of interests, professional attitudes and ex-
periences that differ between locals and mi grants. 
However, differing approaches are also due to a 
difference in cognitive and religious appropriation 
of territories, as reflected in discourses of autoch-
thony versus valorisation of land. These differing 
discourses and perceptions of migratory move-
ments and economic changes involve many inter-
nal contradictions and divergences within these 
groups, which nevertheless are major actors in po-
litical spheres. 
In Kwatena, the immigrant miners first came 
into the region unhindered; only later were the lo-
cals able to establish systems of control and to ex-
act tolls. In the Malian case of Kobadan, the pow-
er relations greatly favour the locals, who control 
the migrants and whose vigilante group obliges 
them to pay fees. In the mining camps of southern 
Mali, often far from any regional centres with 
police stations, mayors and other official offices, 
the local population has managed to control the 
influx, activities and much of the public behaviour 
of the strangers. Local inhabitants (the large ma-
boom. The reasons for the establishment of camps 
instead of finding housing in villages are manifold: 
first, the general presence of villages (e.g. there 
are no villages at all close to Bountwanou); and se-
cond, the willingness of local inhabitants to accept 
migrants. In Kwatena in Benin, the locals were at 
first quite reluctant to accept migrants, but later 
saw the possibility of earning some additional in-
come from their presence directly in the village. 
Another factor is the sustainability of gold ex-
traction at a certain site, offering longer prospects 
that may incline people to build more permanent 
accommodation.
The new gold boom sites are all marked by a heavy 
influx of strangers from various places. Evidently 
the migrants are obliged to establish viable social 
relations with local populations, especially when vil-
lages are located close to the gold fields. These rela-
tions are often marked by strong tensions, but may 
also lead to »working arrangements«, especially in 
cases where local inhabitants are already or about 
to become gold miners. In other words, the major 
normative elements described above regard local 
rules, institutions, interests, prescriptions and pow-
er structures. I will present this relationship along 
with the following criteria: competition over land 
and resources, the handling of disputes, juridical 
subsystems and finally patterns of settlement. 
Local communities are often split between 
those who engage in mining and the more farming-
oriented people, between those who participate in 
markets, selling goods of all kinds to the migrants 
or renting out houses, and others who see the in-
flux of strangers as a threat to local traditions. We 
should not conceive of gold mining in West Africa 
as marked by a simple tension between local, indi-
genous people as a kind of homogenous group, 
threatened by mining, and opposed to immigrant 
outsiders and the state. In all the discussed ca-
ses, the threat is some selected issues like land 
rights and water rights, which are often solved 
by working arrangements with migrants. On the 
other hand, local settlers may profit in many ways 
from the mining booms, offering labour services, 
market goods, housing and infrastructure. Local 
villages may profit in various ways by a reversal 
of strong out-migration of local youth. Many in-
habitants of Kwatena stress that »now most of all 
youngsters came back to Kwatena« and characte-
rise this process as a positive result of the local 
gold boom. On the other hand, they also point to 
the rapid so cial and cultural changes induced by 
an increased commoditization of everyday life, 
which they do not consider so positive.
However, the migratory drift towards mining 
camps results in very divergent, conflicting per-
spectives of migrant miners and traders, local 
or adjacent societies, and state agents on these 
frontier processes . Miners often view the appro-
priation of new territories as equitable if, in their 
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parts of local economic systems related to the mi-
ning camps. In many cases, they simply appropriate 
a wide range of juridical powers in their villages 
and also intervene in affairs that are not related to 
gold mining or the mining camps. The tombolomaw 
are charged to sanction almost all transgressions 
and quarrels, but deal mostly with cases of theft 
and murder. Finally, they are ideally expected to 
hand those they seize over to the police, who are 
often geographically far away. Cases of vigilante 
justice, including poisoning locals who transgress 
the laws of the tombolomaw, have been reported, 
but seem to be rare. A simple form of sanction is to 
demand compensation. A more dramatic possibili-
ty is the expulsion of delinquents from the mining 
region. The tombolomaw hold regular and ad hoc 
meetings. In these meetings, recent affairs are de-
bated and sanctions against those who act against 
their norms are decided. In some camps, they work 
together with elected representatives of immi-
grant mining groups. Their legitimacy derives from 
the wish of the first-comers, who are in control of 
a certain agricultural zone, to control the influx of 
strangers into a certain territory. They maintain a 
strong autochthonism discourse applicable to all 
strangers, especially to Malinké from neighbou-
ring Guinea. An important source of power is the 
financial assets they command, deriving from the 
multiple taxes and payments for their activities. 
But it would be too easy to reduce their inte-
rests to economic gains. Considering that their 
ranks consist mostly of youthful members, the 
tombolomaw also represents a counterbalance to 
the elders and grants social power and prestige 
in a region previously marked by emigration and 
loss of economic and social options for the younger 
generations. In this context, the local population 
becomes able to control the influx of migrants, 
in contrast to other regions and earlier periods.39 
Parts of the population establish hegemony not only 
in respect to migrants, but also in relation to state 
agents. On the other hand, the state agents are 
simply not willing to intervene in the creation of 
infrastructures or in legal matters through their 
physical presence. Tombolomaw do not fill a par-
ticular gap between the state and the local socie-
ties or still operate on the fringes of state inte-
rest. Rather, they create links between the mining 
camps and the villages of the region, between dif-
ferent circles of power and between various eco-
nomic actors and religious domains. Hence, their 
39 The ways the local population reacts to the influx of 
strangers are quite diverse. In some cases, villagers, not 
interested in gold mining at all, are able to defend their ter-
ritories and simply expel miners. In other cases, the immi-
grants are able to appropriate resources without any con-
cession. In other villages, multiple arrangements establish 
a balance between locals and immigrants miners, although 
conflicts over land, settlement and water resources remain 
frequent. 
jority being ethnic Soninké) were able to set the 
rules of access to the resources and to establish 
a particular system of jurisdiction and control. 
The central institution here is called tombolomaw: 
a type of youth vigilante group that is associated 
with a particular village and its agricultural zone 
and headed by the damantigi,37 the local »lord of 
the gold«. Their role differs, of course, from one 
village to the other, but in most cases they super-
vise all mining activities. In the local discourse, 
the tombolomaw are often represented as a sim-
ple assistant group serving the damantigi. In fact, 
they may work in close cooperation with him; in 
my observations they nevertheless enjoy noticea-
ble autonomy and, in some cases, they control the 
damantigi.38 The tombolomaw, together with the 
damantigi, determine who has the right to exploit 
a pit and the amount of taxes miners have to pay 
to the locals. They also organise important ceremo-
nies and rituals, and they control the observance of 
proscriptions to assure continuing profits from mi-
ning without doing harm to local taboos and while 
ensuring symbolic avoidances by local as well as 
immigrant miners. The roles of tombolomaw and 
damantigi as traditional authorities were previous-
ly only relevant for a particular time of the year 
and for locals. However, the advent of the new gold 
boom has increased the importance of the tom-
bolomaw. Their tasks were expanded to include 
the immigrant mining communities and the new-
ly established mining camps. Before the new gold 
boom, they acted more as a village defence orga-
nisation against thieves and managed the yearly 
gold campaigns and particular rituals. Similar to 
hunter associations, they still occasionally perform 
special rituals in the yearly ritual calendar. Today, 
they operate as a legislating, arbitrating and sanc-
tioning body for all affairs that concern the ex-
traction of gold, life in the new mining camps and 
37 The damantigi is related to a particular village, its ter-
ritories and the local clans as first comers in the area. He 
officially assumes control of all gold mining activities. He 
decides where to open a new pit, how to organise the works, 
how to assign particular periods of the year for mining ac-
tivities (in former times limited to the dry season, with the 
influx of migrant miners obsolete). The damantigi is ex-
pected to conduct special ceremonies and rituals promot-
ing the productivity of the mines and the health of miners 
and minimising the spiritual »dangers« of gold. My research 
indicates that access to this office seems to be quite dif-
ferently handled in each village. A damantigi is obviously 
always male and at the same time a clan elder and head of a 
farming / gold mining household. But in some cases, the da-
mantigi is only elected for a certain period of time and may 
then hand this office over to a successor. In other cases, it 
is a lifetime- job for a member of the same (expert) clan of 
the village. A wide range of dissimilarities, however, opens 
when it comes to the actual power, mining capacities and 
prestige of a damantigi in one of the villages.
38 Vigilante groups are a very frequent contemporary 
phenomenon in rural areas elsewhere in Africa, as well (cf. 
e.g. Pratten 2008, Kirsch and Grätz 2010). 
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lated space of a strong mining community (Doug-
lass 1998). They may manage this with effective 
institutions of conflict regulation and by guaran-
teeing the subsistence of many.
Relationship between mining communities 
and the central state apparatus
Generally, the relationship between the miners 
and the central state cannot be subsumed under 
a single model. We have to distinguish at least be-
tween the state as a legislating and policy-making 
apparatus, on the one hand, and state agents in 
the field, on the other. These intermediaries occa-
sionally act in accordance with their own agenda, 
often against official legislation, but they are ne-
vertheless important players in local power rela-
tions. The relationship to the state may also differ 
between sites in the very same country and may 
change over time. Generally, the state regards 
mining rights as its sole domain, e.g. mining re-
sources as national property are subject to ma-
nagement and allocation only by the state. This 
principle is entrenched in the official legal frame-
work of the Mining Law (Code Minier) of each 
country. This system, associated with a discourse 
of »national interest«, generally overrides local 
land rights. The degree to which the state actually 
enforces these laws depends on:
• the state’s general knowledge about the local 
mining activities,
• its capacities to be present and intervene,
• the scope of the mining activities, 
• whether an industrial investor may be interes-
ted in establishing a large-scale or medium-
scale scheme and
• changes in general policies over short periods 
of time.
The latter point is important to mention because 
legal insecurity does not derive from a conflict 
between national laws and miner interests per se. 
Tensions often arise due to rapidly changing, con-
tradictory und unpredictable state policies that 
the miners have difficulties adapting to.
Gold miners in Kwatena, northern Benin, gene-
rally ignore national laws. Miners disregard any 
official demands for formal licensing to explore 
and to exploit deposits, disrespect any commercial 
registrations, commit tax evasion, work in forbid-
den zones and smuggle gold.
The Beninese state initially did not intervene 
at all. Later, several missions were staged to ex-
pel miners. First, a cohort of the gendarmerie 
deployed at the site; its members were bribed 
to allow further mining. Once these forces were 
withdrawn, many miners just returned to the gold 
fields. Government policy shifted towards a parti-
al legalisation in 1999. Since then, a series of ne-
gotiations have started, aimed at organising gold 
miners into cooperatives that will sell their gold 
role varies with the specific context. They attempt 
to guarantee political continuity in a rapidly shif-
ting economic context and refer to moral values in 
a changing environment. Many local Soninké and 
Malinké inhabitants, eager to engage in mining 
and obliged by the verdicts of the tombolomaw, 
develop a distanced view of the role of the tom-
bolomaw. This development again indicates that, 
in various power configurations, local inhabitants 
are often divided with regard to gold mining by 
immigrant miners. 
In Bountwanou, the distance of the mining camp 
to the local villages is quite important, so that 
there is no direct competition over current land 
use. However, village heads and mining represen-
tatives from Gourma villages (who also engaged 
in mining) frequently contact the association of 
miners. The group’s leader and a local Gourma 
also maintain a friendly rapport, since the latter 
helped the former explore the region. The stakes 
are, how ever, not always arable land. Sometimes 
disputes involve practical and / or religious mat-
ters, i.e. whether the locals have permanent access 
to waterholes, road usage, the veneration of earth 
shrines etc. Occasionally, migrant miners who try 
to explore new gold mines or exploit new deposits 
meet strong resistance from local populations or 
are even driven out of the region (Werthmann 
2001).
In all these cases, migrants form clusters in 
accordance with regional origins as well as new 
associations that overlap regional affiliations. The 
latter possibility generally applies to the heteroge-
neous mining teams, whereas in the camps, miners 
socialise with mates from the same region. Often 
there are delegates of certain groups of migrants. 
Their role is in all cases limited to issues that rarely 
deal with the mining activities as such. As a rule, 
these agents represent members of more than one 
region or one ethnic group. In the case of Kwatena, 
a Togolese resident is the only foreign migrant de-
legate. He is expected to deal with issues impact-
ing the Togolese population, regardless of ethnic 
origin. In Bountwanou, a Hausa chief presides over 
his constituency and is simultaneously the head of 
a butcher guild. In Niaouleni, a homogenous group 
of migrants elected a speaker. The acceptance of 
these intermediaries varies, however, from indi-
vidual to individual. Ethnic differentiation plays 
only a limited role in the mining camp, due to the 
specific labour organisation, flexibility or the con-
stellation of mining teams. The aforementioned in-
ternal norms are not associated with a particular 
group. Ethnicity is more related to discourses of 
»autochthony«, e.g. of local inhabitants legitimi-
sing privileged access to resources or special tax. 
Miners are more vulnerable vis-à-vis the local in-
habitants and the state when they are not able to 
maintain effective internal cohesion despite their 
divergent interests and their camps as a self-regu-
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on small-scale gold mining, apparently because 
the state has less interest in gold mining than in 
other stakes in the development business. In Be-
nin, the miners were briefly (1999-2000) officially 
organised in a council (federation des orpailleurs). 
However, in light of recent events, the assembly 
has completely changed its function, members and 
attitudes. The current members are no more than 
helpers of the administration and are not accepted 
by fellow miners. In Burkina, the state established 
local representations as outposts of the mining 
board, often guarded by policemen. In general, 
they do not intervene much in the internal affairs 
of the mining communities, but try to act as con-
flict arbitrators upon request. 
In most of the studied cases, the state allows 
migrants and the local population to negotiate lo-
cal agreements; but in all these contexts, the state 
may change its policy when there is the possibili-
ty of allocating mining rights to big international 
contractors.
Summarising the particularities of the West 
African ASM gold-mining frontier 
The gold mining frontier is a very particular so-
cio-economic field, caught between modes of en-
trepreneurial action highly embedded in market 
economies and various norms of reciprocity. On 
the one hand, these locations feature a variety of 
divergent interests, conflicts and continuous nego-
tiations, especially in regards to resource access 
and yield sharing. On the other hand, certain rules 
and modes of organisation prove to be stable and 
are similar across various mining camps. Many 
differences are due to the local context. Basically, 
differences between the situation of various gold 
mining communities may be explained both in re-
ference to very local facts – as in the case of Bount-
wanou (and partly in the case of reef mining close 
to Kwatena), where there are no nearby villages 
and therefore no major disputes over land between 
local farmers and immigrant miners – and general 
national situations, like the general physical dis-
tance of the state in remote areas in Mali, which 
increases the room tombolomaw’s scope for ma-
noeuvre. 
Two dimensions shape the situation of small 
gold mining in its local particularities and diver-
gent contexts: on the one hand, there are struc-
tural features: e.g. pre-existing local institutions; 
the degree of heterogeneity of the settler commu-
nities; modes of migration; the aforementioned 
state laws and the modalities of its implementa tion 
in the local context; and changes in the general 
domestic market economy and the global market 
(mediated by the gold price). On the other hand, 
we have to analyse the role of key actors; dyna-
mic entrepreneurs, mediators and local big men; 
the strengths (or weakness) of networks; plus the 
dynamic local reactions and effects of particular 
to the state. At the end of 2001, new expulsions 
took place, because the miners were considered 
stubborn about accepting the conditions set for 
them, i.e. selling gold to state agents (offering low-
er prices) and because a medium-size enterprise 
arrived and signed a contract for a larger terri-
tory and demanded exclusive rights. Gold mining 
has been limited to selected alluvial deposits, and 
most reef miners and foreigners were forced out of 
the mining region. Some local miners were, how-
ever, »bought« by state officials and enjoined to 
exercise controls. These changes undermined the 
miners’ previous group cohesion. 
In Bountwanou, Burkina Faso, the state was 
initially simply not present, because of its lack 
of knowledge of the new migratory shifts and a 
dearth of personnel. In 2001, a spartan outpost of 
the CBMP (Comptoir Burkinabé des Metaux Pre-
cieux), the Burkinabé Precious Metals Office, was 
established to control the gold trade. The fierce 
CBMP officer stationed at this location simultane-
ously acted as a self-declared policemen and set up 
his own regulations. Furthermore, he tried to set-
tle conflicts and persecute thieves with the help 
of an armed gendarme. Nevertheless, people could 
buy exemption through bribery.
The way individual state agents act differs from 
one place to another. For example, state agents 
in Kobadan (in their outpost in Banankoro) tried 
to reach working arrangements with the miners, 
whereas the aforementioned representative in 
Bountwanou behaved like a sheriff. In Bountwa-
nou, however, the state does not intervene in many 
of the internal affairs, but acts only in cases of con-
flicts. This is different from the situation in Kwa-
tena (Benin), where miners still try to solve the 
bulk of their problems on their own, and especially 
from Mali, where state agents appear only from 
time to time. In Mali, the tombolomaw are more 
or less accepted by the state and replace it to a 
large extent. In Mali, state intervention is insigni-
ficant compared to the other cases, but depends on 
whether a larger mining scheme is planned or not. 
Officially, a larger mining enterprise cannot be 
implanted without first agreeing to compensations 
for loss of land. In Kobadan, however, there has 
never been any direct intervention at all. In con-
trast to Benin, Mali state agents try to gain sha-
res only by demanding tolls from the minibuses 
leaving the region, especially those heading to-
wards Bamako. Control on the Mali-Guinea border 
is comparatively lax. The three countries regulate 
environmental and poverty issues very differently. 
The Mali state implemented a special project to 
improve the situation of small miners and to pro-
tect the environment, especially through training 
and providing tools at selected sites. In Burkina, 
a few spontaneous campaigns and missions were 
carried out to reduce the use of mercury (similar to 
Ghana). In Benin, no development projects focused 
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events. All these aforementioned circumstances 
allow the extrapolation of general tendencies in 
the formation of mining frontiers. The following 
hypotheses provide a greater understanding of the 
dynamics of such locations:
1. The more gold mining was a known phenome-
non to a larger region, the stronger the posi-
tion of the local societies vis-à-vis incoming 
miners in such primary mining frontiers (see 
below). Furthermore, these regions have in-
creased capacities to develop profit strategies 
from their experience and to extend the realm 
of local institutions to the mining camps.
2. Heterogeneity, in terms of ethnicity and so-
cials status, religion or nationality of miners, 
does not automatically lead to conflict.
3. The pioneer migrants may transport norms, mo-
des of exploitation and discourse to other places. 
This allows newcomers to join the business.
Beyond the many similar logics of labour organi-
sation, techniques and camp organisation, every 
site and every mining frontier40 nevertheless fea-
tures its own cultural particularities. 41 Such local 
mining cultures, pertinent to the life-worlds of each 
mining camp, are composed of different elements 
of everyday culture, habits and routines, as well as 
many informal rules. I refer to these unwritten re-
40 Provided an understanding of local cultures as plural, hy-
brid and interlacing systems of practices and thought that are 
shaped by many local as well as external influences that cannot 
be essentialised, but only described in a depiction of a moment.
41 In all cases, miners observe more or less voluntary 
ritual prescriptions, taboos and ceremonies and contribute 
to collections for such rituals. The degree to which they ac-
tually believe in these rules differs, as does the ability of 
opinion leaders to dominate the discourse. In Mali the num-
ber of taboos seems to be the greatest. They include the 
prohibition of work on Monday, of work before burials have 
finished etc. 
Table 2   Comparative aspects
Kwatena Bountwanou Kobadan
property rights conflicts over mining resources
religious sites
working arrangements, taxes
local big men interfering
local mining chiefs
few conflicts 
water rights
often conflicts over 
arable land
local land with the gold
local militia regulating 
access to resources
explanation villages distant from the mines
water an important resource
land not fertile, out-migration
arbitration
local conflict 
resolution
guest-host relations few contacts to local miners local militia regulating 
observation of rituals, and 
conducting arbitration
dominance of  
local mining chiefs
explanation miners living in villages
close ties to the locals
distance 
miners outnumber locals
history of gold mining
local institutions able to  
accommodate new 
immigration
Role of the 
central state
state generally per-
secutes miners
selected agents 
working arrangements with
mining chiefs
state is distant
explanation extreme shifts in policies
state against indepen-
dent communities
persecution of foreigners
state is helped by ar-
med guards
state confines role to 
controlling gold trade
internal organisation untou-
ched, arbitrary  
personal interventions 
state is helped by  
armed guards
spatial distance
lacking capacities
state acknowledges 
vigilante group
state confined to managing 
industrial gold mining 
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gulations in each setting as soft rules. They may 
be constituted by local prescriptions. In the Man-
dé area of Mali, for example, people automatically 
stopped working if a death occurred, regardless 
of the status and occupation (miner or local resi-
dent) of the deceased. Monday is usually the day 
off for miners, which corresponds to the weekly 
market day in adjacent villages. Minor differen-
ces concerned the construction of houses and huts, 
ways of greeting and consumptions habits, e.g. the 
omnipresence of espresso coffee at Malian sites 
and the copious amounts of alcohol at the Benin 
and Burkina sites. A local culture is also shaped by 
specific environmental circumstances, e.g. the con-
stant threat of fire in the miner’s camps in Mali 
and Burkina, whereas camps elsewhere might be 
endangered by floods.
In most mining locations, there are various modes 
of norm transgression, i.e. modes of behaviour such as 
gambling, excessive drinking, extravagant clothing 
and partying. The cacophony of large markets, 
bars, video cinemas and other entertainment faci-
lities accompanies the existence of mining camps 
and sharply contrasts with the rather quiet atmos-
phere in ordinary villages in their vicinity.
Excessive modes of consumption are more ac-
cepted in the mining camps than in the home vil-
lages of the young migrant miners, as I could de-
tect when visiting some of the villages in northern 
Benin from which many migrants come. Although 
not usually the initial reason to participate in mi-
ning activities, hopes of consumption bound many 
miners to the camp. Especially younger, unmar-
ried participants stayed, regardless of success. 
Returnees mostly paint their experiences in a 
positive light, triggering quite a series of dreams, 
hopes and envy among those who stayed at home.42 
The latter may be hesitant due to the perceived 
challenges of going to the mines: crossing long dis-
tances, the hardship of work, the sanitation condi-
tions in the mining camps and the uncertainty of 
yields. But they also develop their own grandiose 
fantasies about the opportunities and potentials 
for riches that may await them in these places. 
In this regard, a gold mining frontier (especially 
in more remote rural areas) is an imagined fron-
tier: a projection of all kinds of positive imagery 
revolving around joyful living and the fulfilment of 
young people’s dreams. Conversely, the aforemen-
tioned consumption aspects in the mining camps 
lead other, especially elder, conservative residents 
and locals in neighbouring villages to portray these 
camps as breeding grounds of evil, decay and an-
archy. This more negative discourse again focuses 
on only one, but quite visible, aspect of the mining 
camps. 
42 All this is very reminiscent of other cases of migration 
(and masculinity). Cf. Graw and Schielke (2012).
Primary versus secondary mining frontiers
Differences between the case studies of Bountwa-
nou and Kobadan indicate divergent experiences 
between regions with longer involvements in gold 
mining and those only recently deeply impacted 
by these phenomena. I classify a primary mining 
frontier as a region that has only recently expe-
rienced a massive influx of gold miners, the ap-
propriation of territories and their resources, the 
advent of goods and markets and considerable 
state interventions. With my distinction between 
primary and secondary mining frontiers, I would 
like to emphasize the historical dimension of va-
rious mining frontiers. Historical aspects include 
subsequent differences related to local particula-
rities, like the degree of novelty and economic im-
pact of gold mining for local residents and thus the 
dimension of changes they show. A primary mining 
frontier is a social situation in which independent 
small-scale gold mining was newly introduced into 
a certain area or, when not novel, was forgotten 
as a source of income, and where the massive in-
flux of mi grant miners was a new and considerably 
dramatic event. Such primary mining frontiers are 
related to the large-scale appropriation of alluvial 
or reef gold deposits, especially by migrants. These 
locations are linked to new mining camps or bur-
geoning small villages and the establishment of 
new markets, roads and services in these areas.43 
As another ideal type distinct from the former, 
a secondary mining frontier is a region where 
gold mining is not a recent development. In the-
se contexts, the migratory waves and the estab-
lishment of new camps and villages is already an 
acknowledged factor. A secondary mining frontier 
is typically constituted by the revitalisation of older 
mining areas because of crises, but also by new 
techniques, new spectacular findings and / or fa-
cilitated conditions of movement of people and 
capital. Such examples can be found in the mining 
regions in southern Mali. These two regions are 
ideal types, but there are many intermediary cases 
between the two categories. The main reason to 
distinguish these types is their very diverse power 
relations, as well as varying routines, norms and 
regulations concerning gold mining.
The regulations that dominate the secondary mi-
ning frontiers are due to two processes: previous 
encounters and conflicts with migrants and the 
participation of locals in gold mining. Local inha-
bitants here often practice gold extraction mining 
as a side business, but usually try to enforce their 
norms upon newcomers. Secondary mining frontiers 
often feature the involvement of local autho rities as 
43 A primary frontier may show different features when there 
has been earlier massive immigration of agriculturalists into 
the same areas, though this still differs in many respects, 
such as scale, the number of people and the monetisation of 
everyday life.
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regulating forces. This does not mean that relation-
ships between locals and migrants can be inserted 
into a predetermined social framework. In the case 
of Mali, the system of control established by tombo-
lomaw was only effectively intro duced in 2000 with 
the gold boom, due to a change in the attitudes of 
local authorities with the establishment of better 
control over migrants. A secondary frontier is also 
distinguished from a primary frontier by the fact 
that migrants mostly do not perceive the region as 
lacking in institutional regulation, as stressed by 
Kopytoff (1999). Usually, the migrants are quickly 
made aware of previous experiences that have led to 
strong regulatory demands by the locals. 
Gold mining frontiers do not always develop on 
the periphery of political spaces, but also often 
within. Nevertheless, they frequently create com-
pletely novel modes of resource utilization, econo-
mic circuits and social fields. In most cases, they 
form frontiers of ethnic and / or regional identities 
that are connected to power struggles over natu-
ral resources. Compared with other liminal zones, 
a gold mining frontier tends to be more dynamic 
with regard to settlement patterns and economic 
changes, and it features a higher potential for 
conflicts based on resource competition. Mining 
frontiers do not consist of easily distinguishable 
regional borderlines. Agricultural frontiers, for 
instance, are dominated by different spatial stra-
tegies of the migrants. New settlers stay at least a 
season in the same location, and in most cases stay 
for longer periods, although many wish to return 
home as soon as possible.
Another internal African frontier that allows 
comparative discussion is the new settler area 
on the southern fringes of Lake Chad (Krings and 
Platte 2004). This region attracted many migrants 
engaged in fishing and agricultural activities. 
When the water partially ebbs, Lake Chad offers an 
abun dance of wetland crops and fish yields. Crops 
and smoked fish are marketed and sold in the big 
cities of the region, offering important income to 
the producers and a variety of traders, entrepre-
neurs and servicemen. The social organisation of 
migrants differs here from most mining frontiers 
because ethnic affiliations play a very important 
role. Most migrants stay for a longer period and 
return each dry season. The degree of control the 
local Kanuri population exerts over the migrants 
seems to vary in accordance with the economic 
sphere in question. The local authorities were able 
to expand property rights to land also into the new-
ly cultivated regions of Lake Chad and to allow a 
yearly tenancy in return for crop sharing (usually 
a tenth). Immigrant fishermen, in contrast, were 
able to establish a more independent working and 
property regime, building up associations and in-
tricate marketing systems. 
Agricultural frontiers settlements are not likely 
to have stable populations, and older settlers often 
hoped to return one day to their home region. Yet, 
a greater steadiness in the settlement structures 
and spatial strategies of the migrants prevailed. 
New settlers stayed in the same place at least one 
season and often longer, although many wished to 
return home as soon as possible. Agrarian colo-
nisation often initially led to seasonal and chain 
mi gration and later to more stable settlements 
that became villages. In contrast, when very pros-
perous deposits are discovered elsewhere, miners 
immediately leave the camps in large numbers, 
followed by traders and service providers. A mi-
ning camp may grow into a village or simply dis-
appear. On the other hand, some adjacent villages 
or small towns may experience substantial immi-
gration and expansion, leading to larger, heteroge-
neous villages. Or a settlement might just degrade 
into a ghost town«. The occurrence of these very 
divergent potential developments depend on a vari-
ety of factors, of course the abundance of gold, but 
also supplementary income options in the region, 
markets, security and the local and national po-
litical climate. Tracing the recent shapes of such 
camps after big boom periods, both Katja Werth-
mann (2003a,b; 2008) and I observed a similar pro-
cess: the miners who are more professional, espe-
cially those specialised in reef mining, immediately 
leave the camp as soon as a new deposit in another 
region promises to be more productive. When the 
new deposit cannot be reached easily from the pre-
vious camps, the miners simply transplant their 
camp into the new region.44 Some miners, how-
ever, often stay in the emptier camp, enjoying less 
conflict and stress from controls and specialising 
in techniques less mechanised and more labour in-
tensive (alluvial and eluvial mining).45 
In terms of age and gender, the demographic 
composition of agricultural frontiers is more bal-
anced. The gold mining frontier tends to attract 
primarily very young, unmarried men as migrants, 
much more than women, who often tend to come 
from the region itself. In both cases, migrants 
move in accordance with economic booms while 
still maintaining networks back home.
Conversely, both types of frontiers often fea-
ture conflicts over land between migrants and the 
locals, with various forms of arrangement. Local 
inhabitants, even when in a minority position, dis-
play a high degree of ethnocentrism. Further more, 
throughout West Africa these residents tend to 
emphasize discourses of autochthony (Grätz 2014, 
see below). To discern different types of frontiers 
44 To visit these camps in Burkina Faso often resembled 
a pursuit: on a second visit, the camp may already have 
been displaced, and fieldwork plans may have to be changed 
accor dingly.
45 Members of the adjacent communities often continue 
mining, especially in the dry season or a selected period of 
the rainy season.
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specific to gold mining and differ substantially 
from other spheres of exchange, including agro-
pastoral domestic production, craftsmen and tra-
ders. These local cultural mores are renegotiated 
in accordance with the new geological and social 
circumstances at new mining sites. 
Conclusion
I have described the various social and political 
features that prevail on gold mining frontiers in 
contemporary West Africa. Based on a compa-
rative study of three mining camps, I explored 
commonalities and differences characterising a 
socio-economic field marked by dynamic shifts in 
migration and a growing professionalism of actors 
with various social backgrounds. 
Even though many conflicts over access to re-
sources recurred, processes of social integration 
emerged. The arrangements among the various 
mostly heterogeneous ethnic working teams, as 
well as those between immigrant gold miners and 
local inhabitants, are negotiated and established 
on an informal basis. I have argued for the emer-
gence of a distinctive economic and social sphe-
re, shaped by the specific method of gold extrac-
tion and labour organisation, but also by income 
distribution, linked to spheres of circulation and 
consumption, including the emergence of markets, 
services and methods of accumulation. Gold mining 
is a very particular socio-economic field, organised 
between equitable corporate logics, modes of risk-
sharing and entrepreneurial economic logics, differ-
ing substantially from the agro-pastoral domestic 
production, craftsmen’s shops or trading networks.
Many normative rules and institutions concer-
ning the organisation of labour, access to natural 
resources, hierarchies, profit-sharing and conflict 
resolution »migrate« from one camp to another, 
while being partly shaped by local institutions and 
social structures.47 In this process, often big men 
(Werthmann 2003a), but also local power brokers 
and groups like the tombolomaw, are able to ap-
propriate managing and adjudicating powers and 
intervene. In other cases, mining communities de-
velop their own ways of conflict settlement, with-
out recourse to any institution. 
The differences between the various local situ-
ations depend on the figuration (Elias 2004: 141) 
of local power structures, but also on external in-
terventions, especially by the central state, and on 
economic changes as regards the availability of 
mining resources and the development of markets. 
47 This trans-nationalisation of a very particular legal field 
has an important side effect: it enables migrant miners from 
heterogeneous backgrounds, and newcomers in particular, 
to relate more easily with others. To a certain extent flexible 
enough to adopt local institutions and migrants’ concerns, it 
promotes the rapid development of a minimal social order 
and trust in the newly established mining camps.
may hint at logics that explain their pertinence. 
In some regions, we witness an interlocking of se-
veral frontiers. In southern Burkina Faso, people 
originating from northern territories migrate also 
in search for new arable and wet lands. In some 
parts of southern Mali, migrants stayed after the 
gold boom to start agricultural activities, transfor-
ming a gold mining camp into peasant villages. An 
important difference lies in the structure of mar-
kets, which tend to be more fluid in gold mining 
frontiers. Furthermore, the exploitation of gold is 
possible throughout the year, although many mi-
grants prefer the dry season and combine gold mi-
ning with agricultural activities back home.
To sum up, the gold mining frontier in West 
Africa differs both from its famous antecedents 
in North America (Billington 1967) and from pre-
colonial and more recent agricultural frontiers 
though dynamic shifts, the instability of settle-
ments and camps, the micro-economic effects and 
the social composition of migrants. In this regard, my 
analysis of the internal West-African mining frontier 
challenges Kopytoff’s distinction between more cul-
tural conservative elements and those of frontier eth-
nic innovation. Gold mining (as well as diamond mi-
ning, cf. De Boeck 1998) areas are, in fact, frontiers 
marked by less state control. There are, however, 
some points of debate. The first objection is that 
Kopytoff places too much stress on the conserva-
tive cultural elements inherent in frontier com-
munities. He underlines the distinction between 
cultural and social traits: social and ethnic struc-
tures may change, but there is a continuation of 
tradition as an important way to rebuild the com-
munity and ensure livelihood, which is much more 
important than innovation.46 
Unlike Kopytoff, I argue that frontier commu-
nities may give room both to social and cultural 
innovation, social restructuration and cultural 
imagination, plus transgression in the process of 
community building. Gold mining communities 
in northern Benin, for example, feature both the 
emergence of friendship ties (Grätz 2004a) and 
interethnic relations, often in contrast to the po-
litical relations in the respective miner’s home 
region, and the importation of known institutions 
of guest-host relations into the new context. Both 
technical knowledge and cultural norms, whether 
introduced from other areas or not, undergo sub-
stantial transformations in the new context. 
The norms, rules and contractual relations of 
gold mining sites explored in my case studies are 
46 Kopytoff writes: «Inherent in the frontier process is a 
certain degree of cultural conservatism. The frontiersmen 
may see themselves as being innovators, free to construct 
what society they will, but in reality they bring to the task 
of social construction a given cultural baggage. A techno-
logical tradition, assumptions about human nature and the 
nature of political man« (1999: 33).
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In contrast to the pre-colonial contexts for which 
Kopytoff developed his frontier concept, the state 
is never completely absent from the West African 
mining frontier. The state, however, often follows 
inconsistent policies towards migrant miners, from 
expulsions to partial connivance (Benin), from pri-
vatisation to the establishment of development-aid 
projects (Mali), to simple observation and con-
trol of some sectors like gold marketing (Burkina 
Faso). Despite the relative semi-autonomy of gold 
mining communities, state policies both direct in-
tervene (like the CBMP in Burkina Faso) and have 
discursive effects. Such consequences were espe-
cially observable in Mali, where local actors used 
the official policies promoting decentralisation to 
justify systems of taxation, as well as to legitimise 
tombolomaw.
In this article, I put forward a more complex 
interpretation of the relevant figurations and 
transformations in this social field. My approach 
contrasts with the writings of Igor Kopytoff (1987, 
1999), who put too much emphasis on the distinc-
tion between technological innovation and cultural 
conservatism. This critical perspective, I argue, 
applies both to historical and to contemporary 
frontier settings. 
The relations of migrant miners to the local 
communities vary considerably and may change 
over time, depending on local history, modes of 
settlement and effective local institutions. The fu-
ture of the entire sector depends largely on the in-
terventions by the central state and the domestic 
and global markets and remains wide open. 
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Zusammenfassung
Der Beitrag diskutiert die Relevanz des frontier- 
(Siedlungsgrenze) Begriffes im Hinblick auf die 
Einrichtung von Goldminencamps in Westafrika 
seit Mitte der 1990er Jahre. Am Beispiel des hand-
werklichen Goldbergbaus in Westafrika werden 
die wirtschaftlichen, sozialen und kulturellen 
Aspekte  mobiler Bergbaugemeinschaften, ihre 
internen sozialen Beziehungen sowie Konflikte 
mit den lokalen Gemeinden und des Staates un-
tersucht. Dabei werden  drei Goldminenorte ver-
glichen und ihre Situation vor dem Hintergrund 
klassischer sowie jüngerer anthropologischer Stu-
dien zu Migration, sozialer Innovation und lokalem 
Ressourcenmanagement in Westafrika analysiert. 
Der frontier-Begriff dient dabei  als heuristische 
Kategorie, um die sehr heterogenen Kontexte und 
Konfliktsituationen miteinander vergleichen und 
in einen größeren räumlichen Zusammenhang set-
zen zu können. Ich nehme dabei den Ansatz von 
Igor Kopytoff zur Untersuchung historischer Sied-
lungsbewegungen in internen frontier-Räumen Af-
rikas auf, modifiziere diesen aber insofern, als ich 
Migranten der Goldgräber-frontier sowohl wirt-
schaftliche, politische als auch kulturelle  Innova-
tionspotenziale gleichermaßen zuschreibe. 
Schließlich werden Wege der Integration von 
Goldsuchern unterschiedlichster Herkunft in die 
entstehenden Bergbaugemeinschaften, nachge-
zeichnet, die sich trotz vieler in diesem Bereich 
herrschender Konflikte offenbaren.
The ZMO Working Papers is a series of publica-
tions that document and reflect developments and 
discussions within ZMO research projects. Texts are 
usually empirically based and regionally focused and 
may also represent outcomes of research at an ear-
ly stage. They are published on the ZMO website.
The Zentrum Moderner Orient (ZMO) is the only 
German research institute devoted to an interdiscipli-
nary and comparative study of the Middle East, Africa, 
South, Southeast and Central Asia from a historical 
perspective. Current research focuses on the interac-
tion between predominantly Muslim societies and their 
relations with non-Muslim neighbours. ZMO was foun-
ded in 1996 as one of six university-independent, non-
profit research centres for research in the humanities.
ISSN  2191-3897                                       
© ZMO 2013        
Design: Jörg Rückmann, Berlin
This text may be downloaded only for personal re-
search purposes. Additional reproduction for other 
purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, 
requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s). If 
cited or quoted, reference should be made to full 
name of the author(s), editor(s), the title of the  pro-
grammatic text, the year and the publisher.
For questions and comments please contact ZMO.
for%20miners%20Marcello%2015.pdf), 12 January 
2013.
Vwakyanakazi, M. 1992. »Creuseurs d’or et crise 
socio-économique au Nord-Kivu en République du 
Zaïre«. Africa (Roma) 47 (3), 375-391. 
Werthmann, K. 2000. »Gold Rush in West Africa. 
The Appropriation of ›Natural‹ Resources: Non-
Industrial Gold Mining in South-Western Burkina 
Faso«, Sociologus 50(1), 90-104.
Werthmann, K. 2001. »Gefährliches Gold und Bitte-
res Geld«, afrika spectrum 36 (3), 363-381. 
Werthmann, K. 2003a. »The President of the Gold 
Diggers: Sources of Power in a Gold Mine in Burki-
na Faso«, Ethnos 68(I), 95-111.
Werthmann, K. 2003b. »Cowries, Gold and ›Bitter 
Money‹: Gold Mining and Notions of Ill-Gotten 
Wealth in Burkina Faso«, Paideuma 49, 105-124.
Werthmann, K. 2008. »Frivolous Squandering. Con-
sumption and redistribution in Mining Camps«, in 
J. Abbink and A. van Dokkum (eds.), Dilemmas of 
Development: Conflicts of Interest and their Resolu-
tions in Modernizing Africa. Leiden: ASC, 60-76.
Werthmann, K. 2009. Bitteres Gold. Bergbau, Land 
und Geld in Burkina Faso, Cologne: Rüdiger Köppe 
Verlag.
Werthmann, K. 2010. »Following the Hills: Gold Mi-
ning Camps as heterotopias«, in U. Freitag and A. 
von Oppen (eds.), Translocality. The Study of Glo-
balising Processes from a Southern Perspective. 
Leiden: Brill, 111-132. 
Werthmann, K., T. Grätz (eds.). 2013.  Mining Fron-
tiers: Historical and Anthropological Perspectives. 
Cologne: Rüdiger Köppe-Verlag. 
Yaro, Y. 1996. »Les jeunes chercheurs d’or d’Essakan: 
l’Eldorado burkinabé«, in B. Schlemmer (ed.), L’en-
fant exploité. Oppression, mise au travail et proléta-
risation Paris: Karthala/ORSTOM, 135-149. 
Tilo Grätz   studied Social Anthropology, History and Afri-
can Studies in Berlin. He holds a PhD from Bielefeld Universi-
ty (1998), and obtained his habilitation degree (postdoctoral 
qualification) in Social Anthropology at the University of Hal-
le-Wittenberg in 2008. He has been working as a Research 
Fellow in various research projects in Halle, Hamburg and 
Siegen and held teaching positions at universities in Ham-
burg, Leipzig and Berlin. Currently, he is a research fellow at 
the ZMO and adjunct professor at the Institute for Social An-
thropology, Free University of Berlin. (tilo.graetz@zmo.de)
